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Housing

Bringing private homes into social ownership can rewire the housing system

This report looks at 3 scenarios where buying private homes for social ownership can play a role in shaping the housing market and growing new, more equitable housing models.

This combination of a market in which new supply may be stunted for some time, where private landlords may be leaving the market at higher rates than previously and, owing to lower affordability, wider transactions may be lower, has repositioned programmes of socialisation as potentially both necessary to correct for lower rates of supply, and opportune, given the likely flow of new homes for sale from landlords (Diner, 2023).

This is particularly pronounced in larger cities where demand for housing is even greater. In London, Birmingham, Bristol and Brighton, for example, typically fewer than 1 in 10 moves to social housing are from the private rented sector.

As such, private-to-social conversions may make housing access harder for long-term private renters, by reducing the available private rented stock without realistically giving them a feasible chance of accessing these new social homes. This is a particular concern in the current market, where analysis shows that the number of rental listings has been falling in major cities such as London, making access to housing more challenging for renters (Ashton, 2023).

This is, of course, linked closely to the overall supply of social homes. Increasing social supply would at some point ensure that these distributional risks are mitigated, and that the flow from private to social homes would increase. Put plainly, were the stock of social housing large enough to meet the needs of homeless people and to address overcrowding, in private and social tenures, then any additional new social homes would contribute to moving low-income private renters into social housing.

However, this would require a significant increase in the supply of social homes over several years, risking a prolonged period of disruption before yielding these results.

Acquisition can be an effective approach if focused well

These criticisms highlight the potential limitations of large-scale, grant-intensive programmes of private-to-social acquisition, particularly when there is pressure on the private rented sector in higher-demand markets, and where focusing efforts on new building is likely to offer a less risky route to expanding social supply. However, this risks an oversimplification, and perhaps too ‘snapshot’ a view, of how the housing system works, and therefore ignores the constructive role that acquisition can play.

The housing market is dynamic and the balance of tenures is not fixed at any point in time. We are adding to the stock of homes, both social and private, all the time, through new construction and because the supply of homes to rent and the balance of tenures is constantly changing. 

As discussed previously, this is particularly true in the current moment as the mortgage-backed buy-to-let sector is, or at least has been, contracting. Where these homes end up, whether bought by residential buyers, taken on by wealthier landlords or cash investors, or flipped into short-term lets or other forms of more profitable private provision, will have important consequences for which groups are squeezed in the housing system. Ultimately, the full scale of the opportunity cost from socialising homes for general needs social housing is unclear when certainty on the future size of the private rented sector is unclear.   

Nonetheless, these observations should lead to 2 key considerations for the future role that acquisition can play. 

First, moving homes from the private sector into subsidised social housing is not the only way in which we might frame shifts in ownership. As noted in previous JRF work, the ownership model that underpins our private rental market, a collection of largely small-scale amateur landlords, is a core reason for the sector’s dysfunction, driving insecurity and the low investment that leads to poor conditions (Baxter et al, 2022).

This is not the case in every housing market. Across Europe, for example in Germany and Scandinavian countries, there are more pluralistic rental markets, where a greater share of homes are owned by non-profit or cooperatively owned entities, providing homes more akin to affordable housing in the UK (Davies et al, 2017).

The acquisition of homes should not just be about level of subsidy, but should also focus on  the different ownership models that underpin our housing market, particularly if the model that has underpinned the private rental market to date is showing signs of fraying. 

Second, where the private rental market goes next will be shaped, or is available to be shaped, by policy choices, including regulation and the nature and level of public expenditure. As noted previously, public spending on the existing stock of homes far outweighs that spent on new construction, and this spending can have market-shaping and distorting effects, including supporting, however inadvertently, extractive and dysfunctional business models. 

Accordingly, instead of viewing the role of acquisition as an alternative (or worse, as a competitor) to investment in the new supply of social homes, we should position it as a tool for shaping markets and challenging harmful business models. This would mean moving from a largely passive system of subsidy, where cash transfers fund access to private provision, to one where public spending is used as an anchor for reform. 

With this in mind, we propose that acquisition has a particular value when used in 3 particular areas:

  • to reduce the cost of providing TA by replacing expensive forms of private provision that have emerged in response to the higher returns they can get by providing TA
  • to challenge an extractive model of landlordism in lower-cost rental markets in which poor conditions and poor management are rife, and where rental payments are not benefiting local communities, by growing a community rental sector
  • as part of a wider plan to reform the Right to Buy scheme, to arrest the decline of social housing and to keep subsidies in the system.

This is not an exclusive list of the uses of acquisition, not least as here we focus intentionally on models that focus on homes from the secondary market. Separately, JRF has published work calling for greater support for housing providers to buy up a greater share of new-build homes for use as social housing, using such a programme to keep rates of new constructions up in a market where lower demand is leading housebuilders to stall sites (Lloyd et al, 2023).

Rather these 3 areas are chosen to offer some examples of where public spending is working in a dysfunctional way, either by supporting extractive business models or by yielding poor value for money, and where public procurement alongside wider policy reform could create impactful change. The following chapters outline how this can be achieved.

Out-competing the worst-quality, highest-cost TA providers

The cost of providing TA has increased because of higher demand, but this has been worsened by how the nature of provision has shifted, in dysfunctional ways, in recent years.

In the last decade (Q2 2013 to Q2 2023), the proportion of TA provision delivered through nightly-provided accommodation has grown from 14% to 23% of total provision (see Figure 4), with almost 1 in 4 households in TA now in nightly-provided accommodation. These providers cost local councils 5 times as much as local authority-owned provision.

The nightly accommodation model has largely been enabled by intermediaries who lease homes from private landlords who receive a higher rent than they would otherwise get from letting a home in the traditional rental market, and then let these at nightly rates to councils. Shelter research finds that these firms have some of the highest-value contracts with councils across England (Garvie, 2020).

This represents a dysfunctional situation, where it is far more lucrative for a landlord to provide short-term accommodation than it is to provide a decent, long-term home, and where landlords are not only capitalising on the homelessness crisis, but are also prolonging it by reducing the supply of homes that homeless families could otherwise move into. 

This structure also means that driving these providers out of the market – through replacing them with publicly-owned provision – means these homes will end up back in the traditional private rented sector or will be sold, thereby mitigating some of the risk that acquisition will constrain private supply. 

Reducing a council’s reliance on these expensive nightly providers and replacing this with publicly-owned provision would create significant savings for both the Treasury and councils. For example, in London, a home let at LHA rates compared to TA rates would save £8,800 a year in Housing Benefit expenditure.3

In-housing TA as an anchor for deeper reform

Alongside cost savings, greater public ownership in the TA sector would also allow for a greater focus on conditions across the sector. This is both by increasing the supply of lower-cost, higher-quality options available to councils (through a greater pool of publicly-owned temporary options), meaning private providers would have greater competition; and also by creating a backstop for efforts to drive up standards through tougher regulation. 

Increasing regulation in the current system has led to concerns about impacting the supply of landlords willing to let TA. Take for example London Council’s experience of introducing a cost cap: this cap was agreed between London boroughs, and set a maximum amount that a council would pay for TA of different types (Garvie, 2020). This had the impact of reducing the amount councils were paying for accommodation, but also led to a rise in the use of bed and breakfast accommodation (generally accepted to be the most unsuitable form of TA) when supply became more constrained as landlords withdrew from the market.

Understandably, this leads some to have concerns that further tightening the regulation of TA providers at a time when they are facing increased demand could make it harder to house homeless households. The capacity for councils to socialise homes and use them to provide TA can and should be used to mitigate the risk of reduced supply. 

This would mean that were landlords to pull out of providing TA by putting homes back into the general private rented sector or selling them, councils could replace this supply through their procurement, also giving them greater control over the quality and management of these homes. 

Therefore, efforts to acquire more homes to provide TA should be paired with tough regulations. As set out in recent work by Shelter, which co-designed policy solutions with those with experience in TA, this should include, as a minimum:

  • requiring providers of TA to be covered by a social housing regulator, and therefore subject to suitability standards that are proactively enforced 
  • instructing local authorities to inspect TA for quality before allocation 
  • introducing new national standards on facilities and services in TA to be implemented.

Going further than this could include placing greater downward pressure on temporary rents by further lowering the cost cap in London, and applying similar caps across other parts of England. Quality standards could be further raised by ensuring that when the Decent Homes Standard is applied to the private rented sector through the Renters Reform Bill (Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities, 2023b), this also applies to homes let as TA.

Supporting growth of publicly-owned temporary homes 

Growing the stock of publicly-owned TA should be achieved by targeting support in areas where demand is highest. TA in England is highly concentrated in large cities – particularly London (24 out of the 30 areas with the highest proportion of households in TA per 1,000 households are in London4). Extending the LAHF by adding a third phase focused specifically on growing the pool of homes owned to provide TA would provide the necessary capital to achieve this. 

The effectiveness of this funding for these purposes could be enhanced through central government working closely with TA hotspots to set up regional housing companies, owned by consortia of local councils or by combined authorities, to procure and manage these homes. 

This could draw on the example of Capital Letters, an organisation owned by member councils across London and backed by the Government, which acts as a letting agency service and matches suitable tenants – who are currently homeless – with landlords who can offer a home (Capital Letters, 2024).

This would allow central government to issue the capital required to acquire homes as an equity loan, taking a stake in the company and meaning that money would be returned to the Treasury as homes are sold (ideally in response to reducing demand for TA). 

The housing companies would then secure financing. Being owned by local government would allow the entity to benefit from the lower-cost borrowing facilities that its council owners have access to – through the Public Works Loan Board – while allowing it to have greater freedom over its accounting approach, reducing its grant requirement. 

It would also be possible for housing companies to attract institutional investment, such as through pension funds who may offer lower-cost lending in return for stable, longer-term returns. This could be particularly attractive in the current fiscal environment, where concerns about the level and cost of government borrowing are present. 

Such an approach could achieve significant savings. Were the central government to endow such an organisation with the equivalent to the LAHFs historic funding allocation (£750 million), we estimate that a scheme run in this way could replace between one-third and a half of the demand for nightly TA, saving between £26.4 million and £52.8 million a year in benefits expenditure.5

This is a significant amount of public expenditure. Despite this, lower-cost markets face disproportionately high rates of poor-quality housing. As Figure 6 shows, local authorities where rents are below the English average are more likely to have a high proportion of homes which fail to meet the Decent Homes Standard.

This has been underpinned by a particularly extractive form of buy-to-let landlordism, where these regions have also been targeted by landlords from outside of the local area, attracted to lower house prices, stronger house price growth and higher rental yields that can make these properties an attractive investment opportunity (Pickford, 2021). This means that the rent paid in these areas, and the significant volumes of public spending that are part of this, flow out of the local area and economy, further perpetuating weak economies and undermining the building of community wealth.

Public spending can catalyse a better housing market

Under the current system, significant spending on Housing Benefit is a passive influence on local housing markets. Instead, we should utilise it to grow new models of housing provision wherein the public money flowing into the market and rent paid by tenants both contribute to higher-quality and more energy-efficient homes, and stay within local communities.

Lower-cost housing markets offer a particular opportunity for this approach. The lower cost of acquiring homes makes it viable to purchase, retrofit and rent out homes with little or no grant. And, as these homes would be a challenger to the existing private rented sector – not traditional social housing – this would not create the displacement risks of traditional private-to-social acquisition (enabled, as lower average rents would not require the deep subsidy brought by social housing). Schemes could even explicitly seek to acquire homes where landlords are selling up, ensuring sitting tenants are not displaced.

Several organisations are already taking approaches such as this, for example, East Marsh United in Grimsby and Giroscope in Hull. East Marsh United is a community group in the East Marsh area of Grimsby (East Marsh United, 2024). It is focused on improving the local area and does so through a range of activities, including arts programmes, street clean-ups, tree planting and time banking – a way of exchanging skills and services with neighbours, without money changing hands. It recently purchased a small number of homes in the area, which it is using to provide housing to local people and is utilising the revenue from this to fund their local activities.

Giroscope is a housing charity based in West Hull (Giroscope, 2024). It has been operating since the 1980s and currently owns and manages a significant number of homes in its area of Hull, renting to those in housing need. These homes are often in poor condition or empty when they are acquired by Giroscope, which renovates them and, in doing so, creates training opportunities for local people, supporting access to employment. These activities also anchor further projects locally, such as bike recycling schemes and programmes to give low-income households access to technology.

Both of these organisations exemplify a form of community-based landlordism and stand in opposition to the dominant model of absent, extractive, buy-to-let landlordism that otherwise dominates in these areas. While they take different approaches, each is generating income and wealth which is reinvested back into its local community.

Acquisition can grow a community rented sector

Growing a community rented sector would mean local community-owned organisations taking on the dominant model of private landlordism and offering a more secure, high-quality alternative by buying up homes, retrofitting them and letting them out.

Where they exist, this should focus on providing the support to existing community-led housing organisations to enable them to scale up. Where these organisations do not exist, or do not wish to scale up, councils or other local ‘anchor’ institutions could play a role in incubating new organisations. For example, councils could establish new ‘arm’s length’ housing companies specialising in acquiring existing stock, which could later be spun out. Equally, these could be owned by other local anchor institutions such as major public institutions, local authority or public-sector pension providers, or collections of civil society organisations.

A criticism of community-led housing is often around scale, with organisations often having long lead times in delivering relatively small numbers of homes. Much of this reflects the difficulty of accessing land and the high cost of new builds, and the significant cost of grants needed to make it viable. Focusing such organisations on the existing stock and in lower-cost markets would overcome these issues. Lower entry costs would mean acquiring homes would be more affordable, while they would, in many ways, be replicating a version of the buy-to-let model, which has shown its potential to scale up.

Organisations would likely differ across the country, and this would be desirable as they respond to the characteristics and issues in local places. A more universal framework could support them to grow, but this would require the following 3 things:

Revenue funding to support growth

To support existing community groups growing in scale, or the establishment of new institutions where none currently exist, there is a need for revenue funding to support professional fees, staffing, and so on. This could be modelled on the first wave of the Community Housing Fund, which supported community-led housing organisations, both through seed-corn funding to see new institutions founded, and through getting projects from ideas through to planning applications (Homes England, 2021). A similar revenue fund could incubate and grow new community landlord models.

Guarantees to support low borrowing costs

A key barrier to the growth of the community-led landlord model would be the high cost of borrowing in the current higher-rate environment. Where local authorities are involved, they could draw on Public Works Loan Board (PWLB) lending, which has lower rates.

Where there is appetite locally, councils could pass on this lending on by setting up a Revolving Loan Fund for the purpose of growing a community rental sector, and there is precedent for similar, for example in Cornwall, where the local council set up a loan fund to support new-build community-led housing organisations (Community Led Homes, 2024b).

Outside of this local approach, central government could support access to lower-cost borrowing. Homes England, England’s housing delivery agency, already has a track record in working with private sector lenders to support access to finance where the market alone may struggle to lend, and in using government guarantees that could keep borrowing costs down (Cooke and Baxter, 2023). The Government (via Homes England or separately) could work with the social lending sector, which has grown in recent years and has a track record of lending on community-led housing projects (Community Led Homes, 2024a), to guarantee or de-risk lending, thereby reducing borrowing costs.

Our modelling shows that in most low-cost housing markets, reduced borrowing rates are sufficient to make it viable to acquire, retrofit and re-let homes at Local Housing Allowance (LHA) levels without any additional grant.

Grants for retrofitting homes

In addition to borrowing, in some markets access to capital grants will be necessary to make some projects viable. A core cost input will be for the retrofitting of homes, and there are already several different schemes on offer to support the retrofitting of homes with energy-efficiency measures.

The Government has committed around £12 billion in funding through various Help to Heat schemes that include funding for decarbonising social housing, a boiler upgrade scheme and the Energy Company Obligation (ECO) scheme. A number of these schemes, including ECO, are devolved to local authorities and energy companies to administer, depending on local priority and need (Department for Energy Security and Net Zero, 2023). This offers an opportunity for local authorities, working with energy companies, to support community-led housing groups with funding by offering block grants to support the retrofitting of homes.

Collectively, these 3 areas could make significant inroads into growing the community rented model.

This situation is driven by 2 issues with the way the Right to Buy operates. First, rules on how much of the receipts local authorities can keep and how they can be spent have made it hard for councils to recycle them into new supply (Local Government Association, 2023b). Second, the initial subsidy, the discount given to the sitting tenant to allow them to buy their home, is lost when they come to sell their home (partially after 1 year, and fully after 5 years), missing an opportunity for this to be recycled into the supply of social homes to rent or own. JRF analysis estimates that around £35 billion in subsidy has been lost since 1998–99, which could have otherwise been used to provide social homes for rent or ownership.6

Mechanics of Right to Buy need reforming

Despite these challenges, and the rhetorical value of resocialisation, in many cases, buying back Right to Buy homes will not be the best approach for acquisition funds, and even schemes such as the Mayor of London’s Right to Buy-back scheme have shied away from focusing specifically on ex-Right to Buy homes. This is likely in part about practicality, and also because focusing grants on reacquiring homes would mean that the public sector would face resubsidising a home they had already subsidised twice before (on its construction and when sold to a sitting tenant).

Using acquisition in this way also dodges the more fundamental questions about the design of the Right to Buy, particularly in a world where both major parties are committed to keeping the policy. As such, we need to consider how the Right to Buy can be reformed to arrest the loss of social housing going forward; while acquisition can play a role in this, it should be designed into the model.

This means confronting 2 key challenges. First, how councils can be assured they can recycle receipts most effectively into building new homes. Second, how to ensure that the public subsidy put into building social homes and then discounting them for sale to sitting tenants is kept in perpetuity, so it can benefit more people over the life of the home. 

Ensuring homes sold under Right to Buy can be replaced 

In 2021, reforms were put in place that extended the time local authorities have to spend new and existing Right to Buy receipts, from 3 years to 5 years, and increased the percentage cost of a new home that local authorities can fund using Right to Buy receipts from 30% to 40%. In March 2023, it was announced that councils will be able to retain 100% of their Right to Buy receipts (with a proportion of these previously being returned to the Treasury) in 2022–23 and 2023–24 (Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities, 2023d).

These are welcome steps, and as the Local Government Association has long argued, necessary if councils are to have the financial capacity needed to replace homes sold under the Right to Buy like-for-like (Local Government Association, 2023a).

These reforms can be further built on by:

  • being made permanent
  • capping the Right to Buy discount at 30%, therefore making it more viable for councils to use receipts to rebuild the home; or failing this, to allow councils the ability to set discount rates to reflect local market conditions
  • placing a covenant on Right to Buy homes to prevent their use as private rented accommodation in the future.

Public money spent on the Right to Buy must stay in the system

We should build on these reforms and ensure that the subsidy passed to the Right to Buy recipient is not lost when they come to sell the house – reform should ensure that this discount is kept in perpetuity by attaching a covenant to the house, so that the initial discount continues to be applied when it is sold. In practice, this would bring homes sold under the Right to Buy in line with wider affordable home-ownership products on offer, such as the First Homes scheme (HM Government, 2024).

This would build on and enhance the current system, in which those selling a Right to Buy home within ten years need to give their council or other social landlord first refusal in buying it back, and for the first 5 years have to pay back some of the discount (as in Table 1).

Table 1: The amount of the original discount on a Right to Buy home that needs to be repaid relevant to the number of years the seller has owned the home
Number of years home was ownedPercentage of discount that must be repaid to the council by the seller
100%
280%
360%
440%
520%
6 or more0%

These reforms would extend this first-refusal right to councils in perpetuity, and would require 100% of the discount to be repaid at any point. Under this system councils would be given some flexibility as to how they reclaim this subsidy, with 3 options available to them:

  • buying the property back from the resident, using the discount to enable it to be rented back out as a social home
  • requiring a home to be sold as a First Home, with the 30% discount applied to someone eligible for an affordable home-ownership product
  • the council allows the home to be sold on the open market, with the 30% discount paid back from the sale receipts.

This would allow for the Right to Buy-back option to work regardless of market conditions. For example, in the current high interest rate environment, JRF analysis shows it would be possible to buy back ex-Right to Buy properties to be let again at social rent levels with no additional grant in just under 1 in 10 local authorities. In this context, councils would find it more beneficial for these homes to be resold at a discount, or to claim back the discount in cash to be redeployed against building new social homes.

However, if borrowing rates drop to their recent levels, and in line with Bank of England interest rate targets, in the future, this would grow to around 9 in 10 local authorities. This shows that if these reforms were enacted, councils could see a cycling of stock of social homes helping to maintain levels of stock over time.

Were this policy in effect since 1998–99, we estimate that 465,000 homes sold under the Right to Buy could have been brought back in-house by local councils for use as social homes for rent or to own.7 This would mean the social rented sector would be 10% bigger than it is today.

In combination, these reforms would move from a situation where councils struggle to replace homes lost under the Right to Buy, to a situation where, over time, 2 social homes are created for each home bought under the policy.

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